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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ninety-seven percent of federal criminal prosecutions and ninety-
four percent of state criminal prosecutions do not go to trial; instead, they 
are resolved by way of guilty pleas.1  Thus, no one can deny the centrality 
of plea bargaining in our contemporary criminal justice system.2  
Recognizing this reality, the Supreme Court recently decided two cases 
on the same day: Lafler v. Cooper3 and Missouri v. Frye.4  By a 5–4 
decision led by Justice Kennedy in both cases, the Supreme Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends 
to negotiations by defense counsel during the plea bargaining process.5  
In so holding, the Supreme Court acknowledged that plea bargaining is 
“not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system.”6 
Specifically, the Court held that a criminal defendant who goes to 
trial, rather than accept a favorable plea offer, is entitled to post-
conviction relief if her refusal or failure to accept the plea offer “was the 
result of ineffective assistance during the plea negotiation process.”7  
Lafler and Frye address two different plea bargaining situations that may 
give rise to a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) 
where the defense counsel provides constitutionally deficient legal advice 
 
1 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
2 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (insisting that plea bargaining is 
“inherent in the criminal law and its administration”); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 
261 (1971) (stating that “[d]isposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential 
part of the [criminal] process but a highly desirable part for many reasons”). 
3 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“The reality that criminal justice today is for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”) (citations omitted). 
4 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (“In today’s criminal justice system, therefore, the negotiation 
of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a 
defendant.”).  
5 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (“Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a 
right that extends to the plea-bargaining process.”); Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.  See generally, 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].”). 
6 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining 
as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis in original). 
7 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386. 
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based on which the defendant decides not to accept a plea offer, and (2) 
where the defense counsel neglects to inform the defendant of a plea 
offer, which then lapses.8  Such claims are now evaluated under the 
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,9 which requires the 
defendant to show, first, that the defense counsel made errors falling 
below the constitutional standard of effective counsel, and second, that 
those errors prejudiced the defendant’s case so as to deprive her of a fair 
result.10 
Despite its delay, recognition of a right to effective assistance during 
plea bargaining, in a system that relies heavily on plea offers, is a victory 
in its own right.11  The extent to which the Court recognizes this right, 
however, is not entirely clear.12  To better understand this lack of clarity, 
it is helpful to first understand how the plea bargaining process works.  In 
general, plea bargaining is a “negotiated agreement” by which a 
defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s offer of 
a more lenient sentence or dismissal of other charges.13  It is a process 
dictated by personal style, rather than hard-and-fast rules.14  Moreover, 
plea bargaining is a process that takes place largely “off the record.”15  
Contrasting these “informal” plea offers are “formal,” record-creating 
plea offers that some states require to be made in writing.16 
The reach of the Court’s holding in Lafler and Frye is uncertain 
because the phrase “formal offer” is sporadically used in Frye, even in its 
holding, while it is not at all present in Lafler.17  Consequently, it is 
unclear, under Lafler and Frye, whether an informal plea offer may form 
 
8 Id. at 1383; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
9 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
10 Id. at 687. 
11 See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 150, 151 (2012) (“The Court, like Rip Van Winkle, has at last awoken from 
its long slumber and sees the vast field it has left all but unregulated.”) (footnote omitted). 
12 See infra Part III.A (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer). 
13 See infra note 97 and accompanying text (defining “plea bargaining”). 
14 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (citing Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 
741 (2011)). 
15 Bibas, supra note 11, at 150. 
16 See infra note 129 (listing states that require plea offers to be in writing).  
17 Compare Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–10 (using the words “formal offer” six different 
times, including one reference made by Scalia, J., dissenting) with Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. 
Ct. 1376 (2012) (never using the words “formal offer”).  
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the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, or whether, in 
order to assert a claim, the defendant must have received a written plea 
offer, implying that it was “formally” offered by the prosecution.18  This 
confusion presents an important issue because most states do not require 
a plea offer to be in writing.19  Where there is no record of ongoing plea 
discussions, the defendant is faced with the difficult, if not impossible, 
task of proving the prejudice prong of Strickland if she receives 
constitutionally deficient advice—that is, but for her counsel’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the defendant would have accepted the guilty plea.20 
This Note argues that after Lafler and Frye, it is still difficult for a 
defendant to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based 
on a plea offer that was not accepted because of: (1) lack of clarity on the 
reach of the Lafler and Frye holdings, and (2) lack of formal requirements 
regulating the plea bargaining process.  Again, the prejudice prong of 
Strickland requires the defendant to show that she would have accepted 
the plea offer absent defense counsel’s erroneous legal advice.21  Courts 
disagree about whether the holdings in Lafler and Frye should be limited 
to “formal” plea offers or should extend to all plea offers.22  This Note 
argues that the better approach—or at least the one affording greater 
constitutional protection to defendants—is extending the Lafler and Frye 
holdings to all plea offers, rather than limiting the holdings to formal 
offers.23  Such an interpretation recognizes the reality that extensive 
negotiations often occur between the defense counsel and prosecution, 
usually without the defendant present, before any plea offer is committed 
 
18 See infra Part III.A (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer). 
19 See infra note 129 (enumerating states that require a plea bargain to be in writing).  
20 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“Few defendants have documentary or other evidence 
that their attorneys did not tell them of a plea offer or gave them incorrect advice.  Given the 
difficulty of proving such claims and satisfying both of Strickland’s prongs, few Strickland 
claims of any sort succeed, let alone fabricated ones.”) (footnote omitted); see also Jenny 
Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2671 (2013) (“[O]bstacles 
have made relief from ineffective assistance generally inaccessible to individual litigants, and 
Strickland and its progeny are deserving of the well-developed body of scholarly critique 
about the hurdles the doctrine has constructed.”). 
21 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
22 See infra Part III (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer).  
23 See Roberts, supra note 20, at 2672 (discussing the Court’s intent in Frye when using 
“formal” plea offer language).  
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to writing.24  Moreover, this approach does not penalize the defendant for 
relying on a plea offer that the defense counsel and prosecution failed to 
put into writing. 
Additional difficulties arise for defendants when attempting to 
satisfy the second requirement under the prejudice prong of Strickland, 
which requires a defendant to show that if she accepted the plea offer, 
there is a reasonable probability that the prosecution and the court would 
have accepted the offer to plead guilty.25  The prosecution and courts 
generally hold broad, unregulated discretion to reject a plea bargain after 
the defendant accepts it, and there is no clear standard regulating the 
practice of courts and prosecutors in such circumstances.26  This means 
that, regardless of whether the defendant would have accepted the plea 
offer, a court can easily deny the defendant’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on the sometimes baseless ground that neither the trial 
court nor the prosecution would have accepted the plea offer.27  In order 
to safeguard the right afforded to defendants under Lafler and Frye, the 
plea bargaining process should be formalized; in addition to requiring 
written plea offers, there should be standardized procedures to guide how 
the prosecution and courts may reject plea offers. 
Part II of this Note provides background on the Supreme Court’s 
development of a standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
during the plea bargaining process, and how that standard has changed 
after the most recent decisions of Lafler and Frye.  Part III emphasizes 
the trial court splits as to whether the holdings in Lafler and Frye apply 
to all plea offers, or only to those plea offers that are considered “formal.”  
Part III further analyzes the plea bargaining process and the reasons why 
informality in the process places defendants at a distinct disadvantage 
when bringing claims for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Part IV 
examines states’ statutes and court rules, as well as the American Bar 
 
24 See id. at 2671 (“A more powerful critique of regulating the plea bargaining process is 
that because bargaining happens off the record between prosecution and defense—and 
normally outside the defendant’s presence—it is difficult to adequately examine any later 
claim of ineffectiveness in that process.”). 
25 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012) (“Defendants must also demonstrate a 
reasonable probability the plea would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it 
or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under 
state law.”). 
26 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162. 
27 See id. at 162. 
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Association (“ABA”) Criminal Justice Standards, the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), and the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to determine where formal processes are already in place and 
where they ought to be for the future.  Finally, Part V makes specific 
recommendations to formalize the plea bargaining process, and considers 
the implications of carrying out these recommendations for the duties of 
the defense counsel and prosecution. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Standard under Hill v. Lockhart and Padilla v. Kentucky 
Prior to Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court addressed the right to 
effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process in two 
decisions: Hill v. Lockhart28 and Padilla v. Kentucky.29  In Hill, the Court 
held that the correct standard for courts assessing ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims in the plea bargaining context is the two-prong test set 
forth in Strickland.30  Before Hill, the Court focused instead on whether 
the defense counsel’s advice caused the defendant to enter a plea 
involuntarily or unintelligently.31  Now, under the Strickland standard, in 
order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant must satisfy two prongs: 
[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
32
 
Hill involved a petitioner who pled guilty to first-degree murder and 
theft of property.33  Later, the petitioner brought a habeas petition based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his counsel failed to 
advise him about his parole eligibility date—specifically, that he would 
have to serve half of his sentence before he was eligible for parole.34  The 
 
28 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
29 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
30 Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. 
31 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742 (1970).  
32 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
33 Hill, 474 U.S. at 53. 
34 Id. 
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Court held that the petitioner did not satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong 
because he failed to allege in his petition that, had his counsel correctly 
advised him, he would have gone to trial instead of accepting the guilty 
plea.35  Hill’s holding was limited; the Court stated: 
[w]e find it unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under 
which erroneous advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, because in the present case we 
conclude that petitioner’s allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. 
Washington requirement of ‘prejudice.’
36
 
Thus, Hill left open the question of whether the defense counsel is under 
a constitutional duty to negotiate effectively during the plea bargaining 
process.37 
In Padilla, the defense counsel misinformed the defendant about the 
consequences of pleading guilty, and specifically advised him that it 
would not result in his deportation; this advice was plainly wrong, and 
the defendant faced deportation as a result of his guilty plea.38  While the 
Court in Hill was reluctant to determine whether erroneous advice as to 
parole eligibility could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in 
other cases, the Court in Padilla found that “advice regarding deportation 
is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.”39  Padilla was concerned with only the first prong of 
Strickland—whether defense counsel’s erroneous advice regarding the 
guilty plea amounted to performance falling below the reasonableness 
standard of effective assistance of counsel—and held that the advice did 
fall below the reasonableness standard.40  Despite the fact that the Court 
did not reach the prejudice issue, the Padilla majority used strong 
language favoring a broadened scope of the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel.41  Focusing its discussion on the 
consequences of bad advice for defendants, the Court emphasized the 
long recognition “that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase 
 
35 Id. at 60. 
36 Id.  
37 Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Indirect Potential of Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 
633, 634 (2013).  
38 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
39 Id. at 1476. 
40 Id. at 1482. 
41 Id. at 1486 (“It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal 
defendant—whether a citizen or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”) (citing 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).  
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of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel.”42 
Although Padilla expanded defense counsel duties after Hill, the 
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel still did not require the 
defense counsel to obtain a favorable deal for the defendant.  Padilla and 
Hill dealt specifically with the situation in which a defendant accepts a 
guilty plea and foregoes trial.43  Lafler and Frye involve a significantly 
different situation, in that they involve defendants who reject plea offers 
and go to trial, alleging that they would have accepted the plea offer if 
they had been correctly informed by their counsel.44  The new question 
that the Supreme Court in Lafler and Frye faced was whether a defendant 
could assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if she received a 
fair trial.  Not only did the Court in Lafler and Frye hold that a defendant 
could bring such a claim, but it also required defense counsel to satisfy 
the Sixth Amendment by negotiating effectively during the plea 
bargaining process.45  Now, errors in the negotiation process may satisfy 
the prejudice prong under Strickland and thereby constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.46 
 
B. The New Standard under Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. 
Frye 
i. The Facts 
In Lafler, Anthony Cooper pointed a gun at Kali Mundy’s head, 
fired a shot, and missed.47  Mundy fled, and Cooper followed while firing 
additional shots.48  Mundy survived with gunshot wounds in her buttocks, 
hip, and abdomen.49  Cooper was charged with assault with intent to 
murder, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, 
 
42 Id. at 1481. 
43 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 368 (1985); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
44 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (distinguishing the legal issue in Hill 
and Padilla from the one presented in Frye). 
45 See Oliver supra note 37, at 633 (“The Supreme Court’s two previous forays into this 
area recognized the right to the effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining but did 
not recognize the right to an effective negotiator.”). 
46 See id. at 636.  
47 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).  
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and being a habitual offender.50  
The prosecution offered, twice, that in exchange for a guilty plea, it would 
dismiss two of the charges and recommend a prison sentence of fifty-one 
to eighty-five months on the remaining charges.51  Cooper rejected these 
offers, allegedly because his defense counsel “convinced him that the 
prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to murder Mundy 
because she was shot below the waist.”52  Cooper rejected a less favorable 
plea at trial, and was convicted on all counts; he was sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum jail sentence of 185 to 360 months.53  Cooper 
appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, and the state court 
of appeals rejected his claim.54  Thereafter, the United States District 
Court granted Cooper’s petition for habeas relief, and ordered specific 
performance of the original plea offer.55  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
essentially because Cooper’s longer sentence was due to his counsel’s 
ineffective assistance.56 
In Frye, Galin Frye faced charges for driving with a revoked driver’s 
license.57  He already had three previous convictions, and this fourth 
offense constituted a felony punishable by up to four years 
imprisonment.58  The prosecutor presented Frye’s defense counsel with 
two offers in exchange for Frye’s guilty plea: the first offer was a 
recommended three-year sentence if Frye pled guilty to the felony charge; 
the second offer would reduce the charge to a misdemeanor, and if Frye 
pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge, the prosecution would 
recommend a ninety-day sentence and a maximum term of one-year 
imprisonment.59  Frye’s defense counsel never advised him of these plea 
offers, and both offers eventually expired.60  The court sentenced Frye to 
three years in prison after he pled guilty on the eve of trial.61  Frye then 
 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1383–84.  
56 Id. 
57 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012). 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1404–05.  
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sought state post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to inform him of the 
prosecutor’s plea offer to reduce his felony charge to a misdemeanor.62  
Although the trial court denied his motion, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that Frye satisfied the requirements of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, and remanded the case to 
the trial court to either re-try the case or allow Frye to re-plead to accept 
the offer.63 
 
ii. The Majority and Dissenting Opinions 
Lafler and Frye were argued and decided together.  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court in Frye held that “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel extends to the consideration of plea offers 
that lapse or are rejected.”64  Similarly, the majority in Lafler applied the 
Sixth Amendment right to the plea bargaining process; it too defined the 
scope of the defendant’s remedy resulting from a Strickland violation, 
which requires the court to “neutralize the taint” of the constitutional 
violation as long as it does not amount to a “windfall” or “needlessly 
squander” state resources.65  Reaching this conclusion, the majority in 
Lafler disagreed with the government’s argument that “[a] fair trial wipes 
clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea 
bargaining” because that argument “ignores the reality that criminal 
justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”66  
For this reason, the majorities’ opinions in Lafler and Frye are premised 
on the notion that defendants are entitled to accurate advice on proposed 
plea agreements, even though there is neither a constitutional right to 
receive a plea offer, nor a federal right to have a judge accept the plea 
offer.67 
Justice Scalia dissented in Lafler and Frye, disagreeing with the 
majority on whether constitutional rights should attach to the plea 
bargaining process, and focusing most of his dissent on how plea 
 
62 Id. 
63 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405. 
64 Id. at 1402. 
65 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012) (citations omitted).  
66 Id. at 1388.  
67 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (finding no constitutional right to be offered a plea and no 
federal right for a judge to accept a plea).  
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bargaining is an embarrassing part of the criminal justice system.68  In 
many respects, Justice Scalia does not respond to the arguments made in 
the majority opinions; his argument about how the system ought to be 
ignores the reality that guilty plea dispositions in actuality command the 
vast majority of state and federal criminal convictions.69  His response to 
this reality, much like the government’s argument, is that no injustice has 
been committed against the defendant who receives the “exorbitant gold 
standard of American justice—a full-dress criminal trial.”70  A “full-dress 
criminal trial,” however, cannot be relied upon to protect the 
constitutional rights of defendants, where plea bargaining commands the 
criminal justice system. 
Setting aside his discussion on the efficacy of the plea bargaining 
system, Justice Scalia sheds light on important questions that the majority 
opinions failed to address.71  In particular, the majority in Frye provides 
that in circumstances where the defense counsel causes a plea offer to 
lapse or to be rejected, defendants must show, under the prejudice prong 
of Strickland, a reasonable probability that: (1) they would have accepted 
the plea offer absent ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the prosecution 
would not have rejected the plea offer later if they had discretion to reject 
it under state law; and (3) the trial court would not have refused to accept 
the plea offer if it had discretion to reject it under state law.72  The majority 
opinion essentially avoids the issue of how the defendant would be able 
to satisfy the second and third requirements under Frye, asserting: 
[i]t can be assumed that in most jurisdictions prosecutors and judges are familiar 
with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and sentences.  So in most 
instances it should not be difficult to make an objective assessment as to whether 
or not a particular fact or intervening circumstance would suffice, in the normal 
course, to cause prosecutorial withdrawal or judicial nonapproval of a plea 
bargain.
73
 
Thus, the majority assumes it is simple for a defendant to prove the 
second and third requirements under Frye, and fails to explain the source 
 
68 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today . . . the Supreme Court of the 
United States elevates plea bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.  
It is no longer a somewhat embarrassing adjunct to our criminal justice system.”).   
69 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
70 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today opens a whole 
new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea–bargaining law.”). 
71 Id. at 1392.  
72 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.  
73 Id. at 1410.  
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of this assumption.  Responding to the majority’s opinion, Justice Scalia 
retorts, “[a]ssuredly it can [be assumed], just as it can be assumed that the 
sun rises in the west; but I know of no basis for the assumption.”74 
The majority’s statement is less than satisfactory for Justice Scalia, 
and more so for defendants, who are likely to encounter difficulties 
proving that prosecutors and courts would have accepted the plea offer in 
the absence of any standards articulating their practices.75  Justice Scalia 
raises questions that demonstrate some of these difficulties: 
[i]s it constitutional, for example, for the prosecution to withdraw a plea offer that 
has already been accepted?  Or to withdraw an offer before the defense has had 
adequate time to consider and accept it?  Or to make no plea offer at all, even 
though its case is weak—thereby excluding the defendant from ‘the criminal 
justice system’?
76
 
These questions indicate the need for procedural guidelines governing 
how the prosecution and the court may reject plea offers, and enabling 
defendants to prove the second prong of Strickland. 
Courts are offered additional guidance under the first prong of 
Strickland, which requires courts to look to professional norms of 
attorney conduct to determine whether the defense counsel’s performance 
meets the standard for effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment.77  The majority decision in Frye extends this reference to 
professional norms to the plea bargaining context, suggesting that courts 
look to codified standards when assessing defense counsel’s 
performance.78  Specifically, the majority cites ABA standards and state 
bar professional standards, as well as state rules and state and federal case 
law to define the duties of defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment.79  
Such standards help defendants prove the first prong of Strickland and 
guide judges in determining whether the first prong has been met.  Similar 
standards should be codified setting forth how the prosecution and courts 
 
74 Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
75 See, e.g., Bibas supra note 11, at 162 (“[D]efendants will find it hard to prove that 
prosecutors would have left plea offers on the table and that judges would have accepted 
proposed bargains, and thus that defendants would ultimately have benefited from the 
proposed bargains.”).  
76 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392.  
77 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688 (1984).  
78 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (“[T]hough the standard for counsel’s performance is not 
determined solely by reference to codified standards of professional practice, these standards 
can be important guides.”). 
79 Id. at 1408.  
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may reject plea offers to help defendants prove the second prong of 
Strickland, and to help judges reach fair results in these cases.80 
 
III. FORMAL VS. INFORMAL PLEA OFFERS 
A. Confusion Over Whether a “Formal Offer” is Required to 
Prove Prejudice 
According to the Court in Frye, “[d]efense counsel has the duty to 
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms 
and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”81  Justice Kennedy 
clarified the meaning of “formal offer” as used in Frye, expressing, “the 
fact of a formal offer means that its terms and its processing can be 
documented so that what took place in the negotiation process becomes 
clearer if some later inquiry turns on the conduct of earlier pretrial 
negotiations.”82  As previously noted, the Supreme Court uses the word 
“formal” in Frye, but not in Lafler.83  This inconsistent use of “formal 
offer” between the two decisions suggests that the Court did not intend to 
limit its holdings to formal offers.84 
In recent cases, however, courts have denied claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on the basis that no “formal offer” was extended to 
the defendant.  One court even cited Lafler as authority for requiring the 
prosecution to offer a “formal” plea to the defendant, despite the lack of 
any “formal offer” language in the Lafler opinion.85  The Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals adds to the confusion with its decision in Kingsberry v. 
United States,86 decided prior to Lafler and Frye, which holds that a 
formal offer is required to establish prejudice for an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim.  The Kingsberry court stated: 
 
80 See infra Part IV (examining codified requirements of plea bargaining). 
81 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (emphasis added). 
82 Id. at 1409. 
83 Id. at 1408–10 (using the words “formal offer” seven different times); Lafler v. Cooper, 
132 S. Ct. 1276, 1376 (2012) (never using the words “formal offer”). 
84 See Roberts, supra note 20, at 2662 (“Surely, if the Court meant to limit the right to 
effective assistance to informing and counseling defendants about formal plea offers the 
prosecution has extended, it would not have repeatedly used the words ‘plea bargaining,’ ‘plea 
negotiations,’ and ‘negotiation of a plea bargain.’”). 
85 See DeFilippo v. United States, No. 09-CV-4153 (NGG), 2013 WL 817196, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2013) (citing Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385) (“Thus, the lack of a formal plea 
offer strongly weighs against a finding that DeFilippo would have pled guilty.”). 
86 202 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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[w]e address the prejudice component, assuming arguendo that the performance 
of Kingsberry’s trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  
We begin by noting that prejudice is possible, notwithstanding a subsequent fair 
trial, where counsel failed to provide accurate advice regarding a plea agreement 
offer.  Logic dictates therefore, that to establish such prejudice, the petitioner 
must begin by proving that a plea agreement was formally offered by the 
government.  Kingsberry argues that the contradictory affidavits submitted on this 
issue create a fact dispute, mandating an evidentiary hearing.  We disagree. 
 The record before this Court is sufficient to show conclusively that a formal plea 
offer never materialized.  The two parties necessarily privy to a plea offer and 
fundamental to resolution of this issue both deny the existence of a plea 
agreement offer . . . .  No facts casting genuine doubt upon the veracity of [trial 
counsel’s] affidavit were presented.
87
 
In Johnson v. United States,88 the Northern District of Iowa interpreted 
Kingsberry as “establish[ing] the requirement of a formal plea offer from 
the prosecution to be a bright line test of prejudice arising from counsel’s 
deficient performance in plea negotiations.”89  On the basis of this 
interpretation, the Johnson court rejected the defendant’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim because the prosecution did not extend him a 
formal offer.90  The Johnson court cited the Sixth Amendment as authority 
for denying the defendant’s claim because no formal offer was presented 
to the defendant.91 
By contrast, in another Northern District of Iowa case, Wanatee v. 
Ault,92 the court found that the defendant was offered a formal plea as 
required under Kingsberry, even though the offer was not in writing.93  
 
87 Id. at 1032–33 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
88 860 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D. Iowa 2012). 
89 Id. at 789. 
90 Id. at 790 (citing Kingsberry, 202 F.3d at 1032 (“Where no formal offer of a plea 
agreement from the prosecution ever materialized, Johnson cannot make the bright line 
showing necessary to prove prejudice in plea negotiations.”)). 
91 Id. at 782.  “The performance of trial counsel in plea negotiations [] was deficient 
[because of] their continued push for an agreement to a sentence for a term of years, once a 
plea to a term of years became both wholly unrealistic and wholly unreasonable as a 
bargaining position.”  Id.  However, it was not a valid claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel because the prosecution never formally offered the defendant a plea agreement to a 
sentence less than death.  Id. 
92 101 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1202 (N.D. Iowa 2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001). 
93 Id. at 1202–03 (“It is undisputed that there was no written offer of a plea agreement 
and that no written plea agreement was ever prepared or executed . . . .  [T]he initial 
requirement of Kingsberry, ‘that to establish . . . prejudice, the petitioner must begin by 
proving that a plea agreement was formally offered by the government’ . . . has been satisfied 
in Wanatee’s case.”).  
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Arriving at this conclusion, the court distinguished the facts of Wanatee 
from those in Kingsberry.  In Kingsberry, the defendant initiated plea 
negotiations by proffering information, after which the government did 
not make a plea offer because it found the proffer to be inadequate, while 
in Wanatee, the defendant proffered information only after the 
prosecution extended a plea offer.94  This distinction confuses the issue of 
what constitutes a “formal offer” because it is not based on whether or 
not the offer was in writing. 
More recent cases rely on a combination of Lafler, Frye, and 
Kingsberry to dismiss claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for lack 
of prejudice when the prosecution did not extend any formal plea offer.95  
Other courts explicitly found that “[t]he absence of a formal plea offer 
does not necessarily mean there were no plea negotiations.”96  Thus, the 
need to clarify the “formal offer” distinction used in Frye is evident. 
 
B. The Plea Bargaining Process 
In order to better understand the distinction between formal and 
informal plea offers, as well as the rules and statutes governing plea 
bargaining, it is worth exploring a more basic question: what exactly is 
the plea bargaining process and how does it work?  To begin, Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines a “plea bargain” as “[a] negotiated agreement 
 
94 Id. at 1203. 
95 See Williams v. United States, No. 2:08-CR-0112 (GZS), 2013 WL 2155390, at *4 (D. 
Me. May 17, 2013) (“When there is no formal offer on the table, this particular duty [for 
defense counsel to communicate formal offers, under Frye] does not arise.”); Gilchrist v. 
United States, No. 08-1218, 2012 WL 4520469, at *19 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2012) (“Petitioner 
clearly cannot establish the deficient performance prong under Strickland without showing 
that a formal plea offer was made.”); Ramos v. United States, No. 01-10369 (PBS), 2012 WL 
1109081, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2012) (“If no plea offer is made, the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining would typically not be cognizable . . .  [here] 
[t]here is no evidence that Ramos instructed his lawyer to negotiate a plea prior to trial, or that 
the government made an offer to negotiate, which he rebuffed.”); Silva v. United States, No. 
4:12-CV-0898 (DGK), 2013 WL 1628444, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2013) (“[T]he movant 
must prove that the alleged plea agreement was formally offered by the Government . . . .  In 
the present case, Silva has failed to demonstrate that the Government ever offered a binding 
plea agreement for 63 to 78 months imprisonment  . . . .”); Ortiz v. United States, No. 12-
4092, 2013 WL 1339722, at *8 (D. S.D. Feb. 7, 2013) (citations omitted) (“Ortiz has failed 
to prove a plea agreement was formally offered.  Ortiz does not claim a plea offer was made, 
and the Government and Ortiz’s counsel have explicitly denied a plea offer was made.”).  
96 Atkinson v. Elwood, No. 01-CIV-5462, 2004 WL 2943665, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 
2004) (citations omitted). 
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between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the defendant 
pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange 
for some concession by the prosecutor, [usually] a more lenient sentence 
or a dismissal of the other charges.”97 
This definition, characterizing a plea bargain as a “negotiated 
agreement,” notably describes plea bargaining as a type of negotiation.  
Courts look to negotiation texts for guidance in evaluating whether 
defense counsel is negotiating effectively during the plea bargaining 
process, “stress[ing] preparation as a required component of good 
negotiation.”98  Also in line with this definition, courts and legal scholars 
have viewed the plea bargaining process as governed by contract 
principles.99  Yet, if contract principles are applied to plea bargaining, why 
are there no uniform rules as to when offers must be in writing and 
whether or not the prosecution and court has discretion to reject a plea 
offer once it has been accepted?100 
These questions are important to ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims after Lafler and Frye because the defendant must demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that she would have accepted the plea and that the 
prosecution and court would not have rejected it once the plea was 
accepted.101  For example, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant’s 
self-serving statement alone was insufficient to establish a reasonable 
probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer absent 
the defense counsel’s ineffective assistance; the court required “objective 
evidence” to corroborate the defendant’s self-serving statement.102  The 
Eleventh Circuit similarly required a defendant to produce objective 
 
97 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009). 
98 Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 309, 325 (2013) (citations omitted). 
99 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea-bargaining as Negotiation, 2 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 119 (1997); see also Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as 
a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983) (characterizing the plea agreement as a 
bargained-for transaction); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992) (“The courts, on the other hand, have proceeded to construct 
a body of contract-based law to regulate the plea bargaining process, taking for granted the 
efficiency and decency of the process being regulated.”). 
100 See discussion infra Part V (proposing that uniform rules on plea bargaining should 
be enacted). 
101 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012). 
102 See Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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evidence corroborating his claim that he rejected a plea offer against his 
wishes based on advice he received from his defense counsel.103  The 
problem with requiring the defendant to present “objective evidence” 
corroborating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that the plea 
bargaining system is often so informal that it does not require defense 
counsel or prosecuting attorneys to create any evidence of plea bargaining 
whatsoever. 
The main reason plea bargaining is informal and largely 
unregulated, as the court in Frye recognized, is that plea bargaining is “by 
its nature, defined to a substantial degree by personal style.”104  For this 
reason, the court consistently hesitates to impinge upon defense counsels’ 
broad leeway to decide how they wish to negotiate offers with the 
prosecuting attorneys.105  As a result, the Court has provided little 
guidance on the duties of defense counsel, setting forth only the bare 
minimum requirement that defense counsel must communicate “formal 
offers” to the defendant.106 
This is not to say that no process at all governs plea bargaining.  In 
fact, much has been written on effective negotiating strategies.107  Post-
Padilla, the ABA issued guidance to defense counsel and prosecutors on 
their duties to inform defendants of immigration and other consequences 
that those defendants may face as a result of accepting or rejecting a guilty 
plea.108  Still, the extent to which the right to effective assistance of 
counsel regulates plea bargaining is uncertain.109  Other guidelines include 
 
103 Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991). 
104 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408; see also G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA-BARGAINING § 1.02 
(2d ed. 1981) (discussing different plea-bargaining styles). 
105 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (“This case presents neither the necessity nor the occasion to 
define the duties of defense counsel in those respects, however.”). 
106 Id.  
107 See, e.g., Dann Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and 
Negotiation: New Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597 (2006); 
see also Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiatior: A Systemic 
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73 (1995). 
108 Mark Walsh, Task Force Probes Defense Lawyers’ Role After Padilla, A.B.A. J. 60–
61 (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/task_force_probes_defense_lawyers_role_after
_padilla/.  
109 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 41 (2012) (“It remains to be seen whether the Court in Lafler similarly has 
obliged a defense attorney to push (and how hard?) a defendant to accept a plea bargain (or, 
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The National Legal Aid and Defender Association’s Performance 
Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation, which requires counsel 
to be “completely familiar” with “concessions that the client might offer” 
and “benefits the client might obtain.”110  In addition, “[c]ounsel should 
attempt to become familiar with the practices and policies of a particular 
jurisdiction, judge and prosecuting authority, which may affect the 
content and likely results of negotiated plea bargains.”111  The existence 
of such guides demonstrates that defining effective plea bargaining “is 
neither unrealistic nor impossible to achieve.”112 
Prosecution and defense strategies used during the course of 
negotiating plea bargains vary widely.  This again makes regulating the 
process more difficult.  Courts take several factors into account to 
determine whether a plea agreement should be reached, and if so, what 
the plea agreement should entail.113  The factors both parties evaluate 
include the strength of each side’s case, how the jury is likely to lean in a 
given location, how evidentiary issues in the case are governed by legal 
rules, and the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (“BATNA”) that 
is available to each side.114  For defense counsel, such evaluation is a 
matter of becoming familiar with “the prosecutor’s personality” and how 
“[the] judge’s reactions to specific types of crimes” will likely affect the 
outcome of the case.115  On the other hand, the prosecution’s evaluation 
comes down to whether the evidence is strong enough against the 
defendant to render the case worthwhile to take to trial.116 
The literature describing plea bargaining strategies makes clear that 
plea bargaining is by and large a process dictated by experience rather 
than hard-and-fast rules.  As Professors Scott and Stuntz note: 
[t]he problem is that one cannot distinguish between good and bad bargaining by 
looking at the process by which the lawyers reached their deal.  A two-minute 
conversation with the prosecutor in the hallway with only slight advance 
 
for that matter, to push a prosecutor to offer one).”).  
110 GUIDELINE 6.2: THE CONTENTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, NLADA, available at 
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_Guidelines#sixone.  
111 Id.; see also ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, 1 TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL 
CASES §§ 201–19 (5th ed. 1988). 
112 Roberts, supra note 20, at 2666.  
113 See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 99, at 121.  
114 See id. 
115 See id. at 122. 
116 See id. at 124. 
SABRINA MIRZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:51 PM 
2015] FORMALIZING THE PLEA BARGANING PROCESS 505 
 
 
preparation may represent evidence of sloppiness and sloth.  Or it may be that 
defense counsel, who has a great deal of experience in dealing with similar cases, 
knows the market price, realizes that investigation is extremely unlikely to lead 
anywhere, and understands how to get to the best offer expeditiously.  In a context 
where bargaining skill depends more on knowledge of information about other 
cases than on case-specific preparation, it is hard to judge a defense attorney’s 
performance by his behavior in any one case.
117
 
Thus, evaluation of a counsel’s performance during plea bargaining is 
difficult, for example, because less effort expended by the counsel might 
be indicative of more experience, rather than laziness.  Lafler and Frye 
have the potential to encourage further discussion on plea bargaining 
strategies where it was previously considered taboo.118  Mere discussion, 
however, is unlikely to bring about the change needed for defendants to 
succeed on ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from plea 
bargaining negotiations. 
 
IV. SURVEY OF STATE AND FEDERAL RULES AND STATUTES 
A. Standards of Professionally Competent Assistance 
Supreme Court cases applying the Strickland standard have looked 
to the Model Rules to determine competency under the first prong.119  
While the Model Rules do not explicitly address plea bargaining, they 
apply to lawyers in their capacities as negotiators.120  Formalizing plea 
offers, discussed in Part B of this section, facilitates enforcement of the 
ABA Model Rules, specifically Rule 1.6, by ensuring that defendants are 
not denied access to evidence of plea negotiations by defense counsel 
who invoke the attorney-client privilege and duty of confidentiality.121 
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice directly address plea 
bargaining duties of defense counsel when negotiating with the 
prosecution.122  Standard 4-4.1(a) provides: 
 
 
117 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 99, at 1959. 
118 See Oliver, supra note 37, at 637–40. 
119 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003). 
120 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE: A LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES 2 
(2013). 
121 Laurence A. Benner, Expanding the Right to Effective Counsel at Plea Bargaining 
Opening Pandora’s Box?, 27 ABA CRIM. JUST. 4, 7 (2012) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)–(b)(5)).  
122 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION, Standard 4-6.2 (3d ed. 1993). 
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Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of 
the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case 
and the penalty in the event of conviction.  The investigation should include 
efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities.  The duty to investigate exists regardless of the 
accused’s admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt 
or the accused’s stated desire to plead guilty.
123
 
The Supreme Court cited this standard to establish the defense counsel’s 
incompetency in Rompilla v. Beard.124  Standard 14-3.2(b) of the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, discusses the 
responsibilities of defense counsel in more detail, stating that “[d]efense 
counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless 
appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed.”125  
This standard was fashioned following Hill and has not been updated to 
reflect the Court’s holdings in Lafler and Frye.126 
 
B. Writing Requirements for Plea Offers 
In Frye, the Court suggested that to prevent “late, frivolous, or 
fabricated claims after a later, less advantageous plea offer has been 
accepted or after a trial leading to conviction with resulting harsh 
consequences,” states may require that “all offers must be in writing.”127  
The Court then cited the New Jersey Court Rule requiring that “any plea 
offer” from the prosecution to the defense counsel be in writing.128  Only 
a small minority of states, however, currently requires plea agreements to 
be in writing and signed by both parties.129  Other states have not enacted 
a writing requirement, but have encouraged such a requirement through 
 
123 Id. at 4-4.1(a). 
124 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
125 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2 (3d 
ed. 1997). 
126 Batra, supra note 98, at 321–22. 
127 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408–09 (2012). 
128 N.J. CT. R. 3:9-1(b) (2012) (“Any plea offer to be made by the prosecutor shall be in 
writing and forwarded to the defendant’s attorney.”).  
129 States with writing requirements include: Alaska, D. ALASKA R. 11.2; Arizona, ARIZ. 
R. CRIM. P. 17.4(b); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-3-3 (West); Kentucky, KY. CT. APP. 
BOURBON SCOTT R. XXV; Nebraska, D. NEB. R. 12-4; New Jersey, N.J. CT. R. 3:9-1; New 
Mexico, D. N.M. R. 6-502; North Carolina, N.C. SUP. CT. CUMBERLAND CNTY. R.; 
Pennsylvania, PA. SUP. CT. CHESTER CNTY. R. 590.4; Tennessee, TENN. R. 20; Texas, D. TEX. 
R. 5.28.  
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their case law.130  In Alabama, for example, no writing requirement is 
codified in the state statutes or court rules, but in Ex parte Cassady,131 the 
Alabama Supreme Court explained: 
The problem involved here could have been easily avoided had the plea 
agreement been written and all the terms and conditions made a part of the 
writing.  If parties would reduce their plea agreements to writing, and present 
them to the trial court prior to sentencing, rather than afterward, as was done here, 
resolution of cases questioning the existence or contents of plea agreements 
would be greatly facilitated.  The record would also show whether or not the trial 
court had accepted the plea agreement.
132
 
Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court is clear that written plea agreements 
greatly facilitate the resolution of cases where the existence or the content 
of a given plea agreement is at issue. 
Memorializing plea agreements further allows courts to ensure that 
plea agreements have a factual basis.  For example, Oregon provides that 
“[t]he court shall determine whether the plea is the result of prior plea 
discussions and a plea agreement.  If the plea is the result of a plea 
agreement, the court shall determine the nature of the agreement.”133  It 
would be difficult for a court to determine whether a plea is the result of 
prior plea discussions, however, if there is no record of those prior plea 
discussions.134  Interestingly, documentation of plea discussions is 
required under Florida law when the defendant is pro se, requiring that 
the prosecuting attorney “maintain the record of direct discussions with a 
defendant who represents himself or herself and make the record 
available to the trial judge upon the entry of a plea arising from these 
discussions,” but not otherwise.135 
 
130 See Congo v. State, 455 So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1984); Ex parte Swain, 527 So. 2d 1279 
(Ala. 1988); Ex parte Cassady, 486 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 1986).  See, e.g., the case notes following 
ALA. R. CRIM. P. 14.3 (describing how the court in Ex Parte Yarber “noted that negotiated 
plea agreements are not unenforceable merely because they are unwritten,” but in subsequent 
cases, encouraged the use of written pleas).  
131 Cassady, 486 So.2d 453.  
132 Id. at 456.  
133 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.390 (West); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1022 
(West) (“By inquiring of the prosecutor and defense counsel and the defendant personally, 
the judge must determine whether there were any prior plea discussions, whether the parties 
have entered into any arrangement with respect to the plea and the terms thereof, and whether 
any improper pressure was exerted in violation of G.S. 15A-1021(b).”).  
134 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“Plea decisions are especially likely to seem inevitable 
in hindsight because challenges depend on off-the-record evidence that is hard to prove.”).  
135 FL. R. CRIM. P. 3.171. 
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As various states that have adopted writing requirements for plea 
discussions explain, formalization of the plea bargaining process would 
help advance the goal of ensuring that plea offers have a factual basis, in 
addition to ensuring that defendants are given a fair chance to prove an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  This is especially necessary 
given judicial disinclination to overturn a conviction, which is 
exacerbated by the fact that most convicted defendants, in hindsight, 
would naturally claim they would have accepted the guilty plea, and 
judges are therefore likely to treat these claims skeptically.136  Where an 
offer lapses or is rejected, there is often no record of the plea offer, which 
precludes the defendant from succeeding with an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim under Strickland.137 
 
C. The Court’s Right to Reject a Plea 
The trial court’s authority to reject a plea offer once the defendant 
already accepted it is derived from the persuasive influence of Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.138  Although this rule affords trial courts 
great liberty to reject a plea, “some reviewing courts require a trial court 
to articulate on the record a sound reason for rejecting a plea.”139  Still, the 
standard for appellate review does not serve as much of a check on trial 
court discretion, as the appellate court can only reverse for an abuse of 
discretion.140  Until the trial court accepts the plea agreement, the 
agreement is not binding upon the parties.141 
Every state has codified grounds upon which the trial judge may 
reject a plea offer with the exception of South Carolina, which relies upon 
case law to grant courts the authority to overrule plea agreements.142  
 
136 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“[J]udges are naturally skeptical and loath to overturn 
convictions and sentences, particularly final ones.  That judicial inclination, whether 
conscious or unconscious, reinforces the difficulties of proving deficient performance and 
prejudice under Strickland.”).  
137 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“Few defendants have documentary or other evidence 
that their attorneys did not tell them of a plea offer or gave them incorrect advice.”).  
138 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c). 
139 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 180 (4th ed. 
2013). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 11; ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2, 17.3, 17.5; ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.3-24.6, 
26.1; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1016.5, 1192.5 (West); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11; CONN. GEN. STAT. 
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These laws require trial judges to ensure that the defendant enters a plea 
agreement voluntarily and knowingly, that there is a factual basis for the 
plea offer, and that courts give due consideration to public interest and 
effective administration of justice.143  The court may allow the defendant 
to withdraw a plea offer in order to correct “manifest injustice” that would 
otherwise occur.144 
While these laws are helpful, more standardization is required.  First, 
clarification is necessary to show whether these are the only grounds 
under which a trial court may reject a plea offer for the purposes of 
determining whether a defendant’s later claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel should be entertained.  Second, as noted earlier, requiring the 
defense counsel and prosecution to memorialize their negotiations would 
help the court determine if there was a factual basis for the plea. 
 
D. The Prosecutor’s Right to Withdraw a Plea Offer Prior to 
Entry of a Plea in Court 
In Frye, the Supreme Court stated that under the second prong of 
Strickland, the defendant must show “that the plea would have been 
entered without the prosecution’s canceling it . . . if they had the authority 
to exercise that discretion under state law.”145  As Justice Scalia 
articulated, the majority fails to describe the specific grounds under 
 
ANN. § 54-1j (West); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 11; DEL. R. CRIM. P. 11; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.170, 3.172; GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 33.7, 33.9, 33.12; HAW. R. PENAL P. 11; HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 802E-2 (West); I.C.R. 11; ILL. S. CT. R. 402; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-35-1-2, 35-35-1-
3 (West); IOWA R. 2.8; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210; KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.08, 8.10; LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 29:145; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 556, 559; ME. R. CRIM. P. 11; MD. R. 4-242; 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12; MASS. MUN. CT. R. CRIM. P. 4; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5; MICH. R. CRIM. P. 
6.302, 6.310; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.35 (West); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32.1045 
(West); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01, 15.04-15.05; MISS. R. CRIM. P. 8.04; MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.02; 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-12-20, 46-12-212, 46-16-105; NEB. CRIM. R. 11.2; D. NEV. CRIM. R. 
4; D.N.H. R. 2.4; N.J. CT. R. 3:9-2; D.N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-304; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-
1022 (West); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.07 (West); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 517 (West); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 44, § 3270 (West); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
135.335, 135.365, 135.385, 135.390, 135.395, 135.432 (West); PA. R. CRIM. P. 591; RI. R. 
CRIM. P. 11; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-7-3, 7-4, 7-5, 7-14, 27-11; TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11; 
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.13 (West); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11; VT. R. CRIM. P. 11; VA. 
SUP. CT. R. 7C:6; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-296 (West); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.431 
(West); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 11; W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 10; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.08 (West). 
143 See supra note 142. 
144 See id. 
145 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, at 1403–04 (2012).  
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which the prosecution may exercise this discretion.146  In effect, the 
prosecution has unregulated discretion to reject a plea offer, even without 
a sound basis.147  The risk of prosecutorial abuse clearly establishes the 
need for codifying a standard that sets forth the precise grounds giving 
rise to the prosecutor’s authority to reject an accepted plea offer. 
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice state, “[a] prosecutor 
should not fail to comply with a plea agreement, unless a defendant fails 
to comply with a plea agreement or other extenuating circumstances are 
present.”148  This standard should be expanded to require the prosecution 
to explain under which circumstances it will subsequently reject a plea 
offer after the defendant accepts it.  If there is a committee of prosecuting 
attorneys who discuss and render a decision as to whether or not to accept 
a defendant’s plea offer, then this discussion should be recorded in 
writing.  The defendant can then ask for the record of plea discussions 
during discovery in the event that the prosecution claims it would not 
have accepted the plea offer even if the defendant accepted it. 
Not only does the prosecution have wide discretion when choosing 
to reject a plea offer, but as discussed earlier, plea bargaining is 
characterized as a matter of “personal style” that gives the prosecution 
the liberty to negotiate in any matter whatsoever.149  Standards should 
therefore be put in place to ensure that no unfair bargaining occurs, or in 
other words, to ensure that the prosecution is fair and consistent with all 
defendants when offering pleas.150  Oregon stands apart from other states 
in codifying what is essentially a fair bargaining requirement, and 
attempts to ensure that “[s]imilarly situated defendants [are] afforded 
equal plea agreement opportunities.”151  Here, as elsewhere, the 
movement by some states to codify requirements for the prosecution and 
court in connection with plea bargaining indicates the need for such 
formalization, and provides an example for other states to follow. 
 
 
146 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
147 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).  
148 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE SCJ 3-4.2 (3d ed. 1993). 
149 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.  
150 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 164 (“[E]ven prosecutors have strong incentives to 
promote and safeguard plea bargains.”). 
151 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.405 (West). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the absence of a formal plea bargaining process from the initial 
stages of negotiation, Lafler and Frye provide a superficial right to 
defendants, without a corresponding ability to exercise this right.  A 
formalized process may be an effective compromise between the 
extremes of a “laissez-faire bargaining system” on one end and the 
overregulation of plea bargaining by courts on the other.152  If the plea 
bargaining process “is the criminal justice system,” as the Supreme Court 
recognizes, and such reality justifies the right of defendants to challenge 
a conviction on the basis of receiving ineffective assistance of counsel 
during plea negotiations, then the process should be recorded and 
standards should be in place to ensure that the process is fair.153 
The Strickland requirements articulate what defendants must prove 
in order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during 
the plea bargaining process.154  Under the first prong, the defendant must 
show that her defense counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional 
minimum for competency.155  To prove incompetency, the defendant must 
be able to present evidence from the record; however, in the majority of 
states, neither prosecuting attorneys nor defense counsel are obligated to 
create any record.156  Under the second prong of Strickland, the defendant 
must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the defendant would have 
accepted the plea absent defense counsel’s ineffective assistance, that the 
prosecution would not have rejected the plea, and that the trial court 
would not have rejected the plea.157  This is where the need for 
formalization becomes most evident, as courts have stated that the 
defendant cannot rely on her self-serving testimony, but must 
demonstrate “objective evidence” to show that she would have accepted 
the plea absent defense counsel’s error.158  Even if the defendant can prove 
 
152 Bibas, supra note 11, at 152 (“In this laissez-faire bargaining system, defense lawyers, 
not judges or juries, are the primary guarantors of fair bargains and equal treatment for their 
clients.”). 
153 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
154 Id. at 1405. 
155 Id. at 1409. 
156 See supra note 129. 
157 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409. 
158 See supra notes 102–03.  
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this, she must still demonstrate that the prosecution and court would not 
have rejected the plea offer.159  Both the prosecution and the court, 
however, are granted broad discretion; there is no defined standard that 
states the grounds under which the prosecution or the court can reject a 
plea offer.160 
To summarize, the plea bargaining process should be formalized in 
the following ways: first, plea negotiations should be required to be in 
writing; second, a standard should be codified, whereby prosecuting 
attorneys have a duty to engage in equal and fair bargaining; third, 
grounds under which prosecuting attorneys may reject a plea offer should 
be codified; fourth, oral discussions among prosecuting committees in 
deciding whether or not to accept a plea should be reduced to writing; and 
fifth, whether the grounds under which a trial court may reject a plea 
offer, as codified in state statutes and rules, are the same grounds courts 
consider when determining whether to dismiss a defendant’s claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel should be clarified. 
The first recommendation—to require written plea negotiations—is 
the most important in light of the confusion that has emerged among trial 
courts as to whether or not defense counsel must present a “formal offer” 
to a defendant before a defendant can bring a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on plea negotiations.161  Even after Lafler and 
Frye, courts reached different conclusions on this issue, as some defined 
a plea as “formal” even though it was not in writing.162  When defendants 
must rely on objective evidence independent of self-serving testimony, a 
writing requirement is necessary.  Furthermore, such a requirement 
would improve other aspects of plea bargaining, such as helping the court 
determine whether there is a factual basis for a plea.163 
Much of the discussion on the effect of Lafler and Frye naturally 
focuses more on defense counsel, and the more stringent constitutional 
duty created by these cases.164  Such discussion centers on ensuring that 
 
159 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409. 
160 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162. 
161 See supra Part III (describing the trial court splits on this issue in more detail). 
162 Wanatee v. Ault, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1202–03 (N.D. Iowa 2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 
700 (8th Cir. 2001). 
163 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.  
164 See, e.g., Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, “Waiving” Goodbye to Rights: 
Plea Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of Competent Representations, 38 HASTINGS 
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defense counsel effectively represent their clients in plea bargaining 
negotiations that occur off the record.165  Less has been said, however, 
about how the extension of the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel to the plea bargaining process affects prosecuting 
attorneys166  Including prosecutors in the process is, in many ways, crucial 
to creating a just plea bargaining system.167  Without documenting plea 
negotiations from the beginning, the potentially onerous burden is on the 
prosecution during discovery to search through all of its records for 
anything pertaining to plea negotiations.  For the future, formalizing plea 
negotiations thus eases the burden on both the prosecution and defense 
counsel during litigation involving an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.168  In our criminal justice system, where a majority of cases are 
decided by plea bargains, the heaviest burden should not be on the 
defendant to ensure that the system is fair. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONST. L.Q. 1029, 1042 (2011) (discussing possible duties of defense counsel “to seek out 
plea negotiations with the prosecution”).  
165 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 11, at 150. 
166 See id. at 174 (“Prosecutors, too, can take steps to guard against the worst defense 
lawyering, acting not just as partisan warriors but also has guardians of justice.”).  
167 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to Do With 
It?, 23 Crim. Just. 28, 33 (2008), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newslette
r/crimjust_cjmag_23_3_yaroshefsky.authcheckdam.pdf (proposing broader discovery and 
“codification and expansion of the prosecutors’ obligations” to enhance “accountability and 
transparency of the criminal justice system” in order to reduce wrongful convictions based on 
guilty pleas).  
168 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162. 
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